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Next  year may be  a milestone  in the  evolution of U.  S.  food  and
farm  policy.  Because  the  1973  act  expires  in  1977  congress  will
have  an  opportunity  to  renovate  policy  in  light  of  the  radically
changed  food  situation  that  has  emerged  in the  past four  years.
Consumers  will  be  concerned  about  effects  of  farm  policy  on
domestic  supplies  and  food  prices.  Advocates  of food  aid  for  poor
countries  will  push their cause.  So will supporters  of food  programs
for  poor  people  in this  country.  Antitrusters  will  challenge  devices
by  which  farmers  seek  collective  market  power.
The heightened  importance  of food  in the  world  and  the  U.  S.
as  a  food  supplier  will  prompt  proposals  for  use  of food  policy  to
achieve  purposes  having  nothing to  do  with food.  Hopefully,  a true
food  and  agricultural  policy  will  be  developed  that  reflects  antici-
pation  of the  future  rather than  the  residue  of the  past.
Tasks for Food and Agricultural Policy
Food  and  agricultural  policy  is  expected  to  accomplish  certain
tasks  and  to  achieve  certain  ends.  However,  there  is  no  grand
harmonious  set  of feasible  ends  upon  which there  is  or  can  be  full
agreement.
At  the  present  time  there  is  great  uncertainty  about  what  the
underlying  food  and  agricultural  situation  will  be  in  the  next  15
years.  Will  hunger  in  the  poor  countries,  high  import  demand
among developed  countries,  and  difficulties  in  expanding  domestic
production  create  chronic  food  scarcity  and  high  prices  in  the
U.S.?  Or  will  an  opposing  combination  of  circumstances  bring
back the  persistent  surpluses  of the  1960s?
At present,  the  overall  situation  seems  delicately  poised  midway
between  the  extremes.  But  the  high  sensitivity  of  agricultural
markets  to  small  shifts  in  the  supply-demand  balances  gives  little
confidence  that  the  existing  situation  will  endure.  Oscillation
between  the  extremes  over  a  decade  or  so  is  entirely  possible.
Because  of inescapable  uncertainty  about  the  future,  food  and
agricultural  policy  should  be  flexible  and  capable  of  dealing  with
situations  as  they  unfold.  The tasks that policy  should  be  prepared
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basic  circumstances  could  be counted  upon for  the  future.
The  following  eight  tasks  reflect  the  principal  expectations  of
the  various  groups  in  the  formulation  of  food  and  agricultural
policy.  No task  is  an  absolute  requirement  for  policy-each  must
yield  a little  if a  conflicting  task  urgently  needs  to be  performed.
Abundant  supplies  and  reasoable  prices  to  consumers.  A
strictly keyhole  view  of this task  is  that domestic  food  supplies  can
never  be  too  large  or  food  prices  too  low.  A  more  informed  view
recognizes  the  social  usefulness  of  exports,  the  role  of  prices  in
allocating  food  supplies  among  competing  demands,  the  necessity
of paying  sufficient  returns  to  resources  to bring  forth  supply  and,
if  circumstances  are  seriously  adverse  to  farmers,  the  possible
desirability  of price  support  as  a remedial  device.
This  very  important  task  does,  however,  imply  opposition  to
inefficient  use  of  resources  and  to  unwarranted  compensation  to
any participants  in the food  supply system-farmers,  food  firms,  or
labor.
Food aid for the poor.  An  established  national  objective  is  to
assure  through  government  programs  nutritionally  adequate  diets
for  poor people  unable to  buy them  at  existing  prices.
Expansion  of foreign  markets.  Both  the  national  interest  in
importing  many  goods  and  services,  notably  oil,  and  the  farmer's
interest  in  expanding  demand  for  his  products  make  this  an
important  task  expected  of food  and  agricultural  policy.
Food aid  for poor countries. Neither the scale  on which  food  aid
may  be  needed  nor  the  extent  to  which  the  U.  S.  public  will  be
willing to  supply it  is  clear  now,  but at  least some  food  aid  is  sure
to be  provided.
Stability of  market  supplies and prices.  Agricultural  markets
are  highly  sensitive  to  shifts  in  supply  and  demand.  Risk  to
producers,  dissatisfaction  of consumers,  and  reduced  efficiency  in
farming  and  the  food  industry  are  among  the  undesirable  conse-
quences.
The task  is to  bring  greater  stability  to  markets  for  foods.  But
this  cannot  be  expected  to  include  insulation  from  the  effects  of
inflation  in the  economy  at  large  or  to  mean  maintaining  normal
food  prices  despite  enduring  scarcity  or  surpluses  should  they
develop.
Income enhancement for farmers.  Farmers,  like  other economic
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their incomes  are  high  enough.  If farm  incomes  were  so  low  as  to
reduce  most  farmers'  level  of living  below  the American  norm  and
to threaten  farmers'  solvency,  the  majority  of nonfarmers  probably
would  agree  that  higher  farm  incomes  were  desirable.  In  some
other circumstances,  disagreement  between  farmers  and nonfarmers
can be  sharp.
Farm  income  improvements  can be  obtained  from  two different
sources.  The first  is  price  increases  obtained  by  eliminating  ineffi-
ciencies,  unnecessary  price  lags,  or  excessive  profits  in  the  proces-
sing  and  distribution  of  farm  products.  Such  price  improvements
are  not  at  the  expense  of consumers  and  are  consistent  with  good
economic  performance  of the food  system.  The second  type  of farm
income  increase  is  obtained  by  means  that  raise  retail  prices  or
taxes  and  bring farmers  and nonfarmers  into  opposition.
A  further  important  consideration  is  the  personal  income
distribution  among  farm  people.  When  the  task  is  to  raise  farm
income  from  unacceptably  low  levels,  many  persons  prefer  that the
added  income  go  to  those who  need  it most rather  than  in  propor-
tion  to farm  size.
Consistency with  U.  S.  international  policy.  The task  here  is  to
make  food  and  agricultural  policy  consistent  with  international
policy  in  the  national  interest.  Questions  regarding  the  relation
between  the two types  of policy arise specifically  in the international
trade and food  aid  areas.  This  is  more  generally  with  regard  to  the
nation's  use of the supply of food  as  an  instrument  of international
policy.
Low governmental cost of food and agricultural  programs. The
form  taken  by  proposed  solutions  to  several  food  and  farm
problems  is  expenditure  of government  funds  such  as  payments  to
farmers  or for food  stamps.  Burdens  on  taxpayers  are  increased,  or
added  inflation  may  result  from  deficit  financing.  The  cost  of
government  programs  is  an  important constraint  on  food  and  agri-
cultural  policy.
Policy  Instruments
Several  important  instruments  are  available  with  which  to
achieve  tasks  that  food  and  agricultural  policy  may  face  in  the
future.  Frequently,  packages  of  instruments  are  required  to
accomplish  particular  tasks.  For  example,  price  support  loans,
temporary  land  retirement,  and  payments  to  farmers  were  used  in
the  latter  1960s  to support  incomes  of grain producers.
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support  loans  increase  farm  income  and  stabilize  markets  when
surpluses  exist.  Despite  the  high  complementarity  of some  instru-
ments,  however,  simplicity  requires that they be treated  one by  one.
In  the  following  discussion  of policy  instruments,  first consider-
ation  is  given  to those  that can  be expected  to  be potentially  useful
or  at  least  proposed  regardless  of whether  scarcity,  surpluses,  or
intermediate  situations  exist.  Next  are  policy  instruments  most
applicable  when  surpluses  and  low  farm  income  prevail.  The  last
group  consists  of  instruments  that  might  be  used  if  persistent
scarcity  appears.
Reserve  stocks.  Reserves  are  means  of  increasing  market
stability  in  the  sense  of  smoothing  out  annual  irregularities  in
supplies and  prices.  The potential  benefits  are  market  stability plus
(1) probably encouragement  of export  market  expansion,  (2)  avail-
ability  of supplies  for  food  aid  for  poor  countries,  and  (3)  some
protection  for  the  U.S.  in  case  of national  disaster.  The  principal
charges  are the costs of carrying  stocks  and  operating the  program.
Stocks  likely  to  be  carried  voluntarily  by  producers  and  the
trade  will  not  likely  prevent  substantial  price  gyrations.  Greater,
though  not  complete  stability,  seems  achievable  in  markets  for
storable  crops,  and  indirectly  in  livestock  markets,  at  acceptable
cost.  Probably  the  average  level  of farm  prices  of  crops  would  be
little changed  from the  average  expected  in free  markets.
A  strict  reserve  program  would  be  less  favorable  to  crop
producers'  incomes,  of course,  than  would  programs  that  support
farm  income  on  falling  markets  and  permit  farmers  to  capture  the
full  benefit  of rising  markets.  The  need  for  clear  stocks  manage-
ment guidelines,  administrative  skill,  and  integrity of program  per-
sonnel  is  high.  There  is  much  more  controversy  about  reserve
stocks  and more complications  than this brief sketch can suggest.
Collective  action  by  producers.  Bargaining  associations  and
marketing  cooperatives  are  means,  in  suitable  circumstances,  of
increasing  market  stability,  enhancing  producers'  incomes,  improv-
ing equity of nonprice  terms  of sale,  and  increasing  marketing  effi-
ciency.  Income enhancement  may be  achieved  (if circumstances  are
favorable)  through  marketing  procedures  such  as  uniform  flow  to
markets,  better  allocation  among  geographic  destinations,  lower
cost delivery  and handling methods,  and even  reduction  of excessive
profits  of  marketing  firms.  All  are  consistent  with  good  market
performance.
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power  that  enables  the  organization  to  set  prices  higher  than
equilibrium  levels  and  to  manage  excess  supplies  by  diversion  to
secondary  markets  or  by  delivery  restrictions.  Such  methods
ordinarily  raise  consumer  prices  and  generate  controversy  as  to
what  is  equitable  for  producers  and consumers.
Voluntary  collective  action  usually  is  feasible  only when  concen-
tration of production  or market areas  permits  most of the  output  to
be  brought  under  the  management  of  one  producer  organization.
Control  of volume  of  production  is  seldom  possible,  which  limits
the  potential  market  power  attainable  by  voluntary  collective
action.
Marketing  orders  are  useful  adjuncts  for  exercising  power  in
some  situations.  Legislation  to confer  mandatory  controls  over  pro-
duction,  market  disposal,  and  prices  on  producers  collectively-
such  as  marketing  boards  or  collective  bargaining  enabling
acts-are  frequently  proposed  to  strengthen  producers'  market
power.
A  significant  counter  force  is  the  growing  tendency  to  apply
antitrust  laws  to  the  producers'  organization  in  the  same  way  they
would be applied  to ordinary  corporations.  Food  price  inflation  has
changed  the  former  apathy  of the  public  to  this issue.
Whether farmers  will get  more or  less  public  support  for collec-
tive action  is  largely  a political question.  My  own  impression  is  that
the  opportunities  and  needs  for  several  types  of collective  action  in
marketing  farmers'  products  are  growing.  However,  the  more
obvious  forms  of raising  prices  through  unregulated  market  power
will  not,  in  the  end,  be permitted.
Marketing orders.  Orders  provide  government-supervised  mar-
ket  regulation  in producers'  interest  and  are  most  feasible  in  those
situations  that  are  favorable  to  voluntary  collective  action.  Their
essential  function  is  to  provide  market-wide  controls  over  product
disposal-and,  for  fluid  milk,  prices  that  voluntary  producer
organizations  can  rarely  achieve.
Under  suitable  circumstances,  marketing  orders  can  increase
market  stability  and  producers'  incomes  by  orderly  marketing  of
products.  Direct  and  substantial  effects  on  producers'  incomes
apparently  are  possible  only  when  minimum  prices  are  set,  as  for
fluid  milk,  or  when  market  supply  is  curtailed,  as  it  sometimes  is
under  state  marketing  orders.
An indirect  effect  is  achieved  when  a  marketing  order enables  a
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exert  more  influence  than it  otherwise  would  have.  Premium  prices
obtained  by dairy  cooperatives  in  markets  regulated  by  orders  are
an  outstanding  example.
Public scrutiny  of monopoly  price  devices  for  farmers  is  making
distinctions  among  the  various  purposes  of  marketing  orders
increasingly  important.  Their  orderly  marketing  functions  are
socially  useful,  and  under  present  conditions  orders  seem  essential
for  stability  in  most  fluid  milk  markets.  But  public  acceptance  of
direct  and  indirect  use  of  marketing  orders  to  raise  prices  in  an
obvious  fashion  is  more  likely  to be  eroded  than to  increase.
International  trade instruments. General  lowering  of barriers  to
international  trade  in  farm  products  has  been  urged  by  important
U.S.  groups  for  years.  The  strong  comparative  advantage  of  the
U.S.  in  food  production  would  be  expected  to  yield  net  advantages
for  agriculture  and  the  nation  if trade  were  liberalized.  But  effects
would  vary  within  agriculture,  with  sugar  and  dairy  producers
prominent  among the  losers  and  grain  producers  prominent  among
the  gainers.
My  own  expectation  is  that other  countries  will  reduce  barriers
only as their  own national  interests  are served  and as  it can be  done
at  little  or  no  loss  to their  own  farmers.  Trade  in  food  will  trend
upward  despite  existing  barriers  and  as some  barriers  are  selectively
lowered.
Import  restrictions  are  now  being  urged  on  palm  oil,  beef,  and
other products.  Export  subsidies  of one  kind or  another  have  been
used  in  the  past  for  numerous  farm  commodities.  Though  such
measures  usually  have  some  effect  on  incomes  of  particular
producer groups,  they are  inconsistent  with  the  basic  trade  position
the  U.S.  should  take  to increase  its  agricultural  exports  in  the  long
run  and  to improve  its  international  relations.
On the  other hand,  if a  nation  undertakes  to  support  the  price
of a  farm  product,  it  makes  no  sense  to  permit  imports  to  grow
while  the  support  program  is  in  effect.
The  U.S.  appears  to have  an  opportunity  to encourage  stability
in  international  markets  and  to  increase  its  own  exports  by
adopting  policies  likely  to  stimulate  desirable  responses  by  other
countries.  The  U.S.  might,  for  example,  carry  reserve  stocks  and
assure  (within  limits)  supplies  to  foreign  buyers  who  take  stable
volumes  under  advance  arrangements.
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of  stocks  by  importing  nations,  and  capitalization  on  the  U.S.
advantage  as  a  large-scale  exporter.  The  much-maligned  arrange-
ment  with  Russia  is  a  constructive  development  in  this  direction.
Food  aid  instruments.  Reserve  stocks  are  essential  for  any
substantial  food aid for poor countries.  The volume of aid  currently
being given  is small.  The  amount  that might  be needed  in  the  next
decade  to  prevent  hunger  abroad  is  impossibly  large.  The  U.S.  is
exercising  virtually  no  leadership  in  dealing  with  a  problem  that
can  become  desperate  for  some countries  and,  therefore,  important
to  us.
We  could  announce  a  willingness  to  make  an  annual  commit-
ment  to  provide  an  amount  of grain  that  is  impressive  by  current
standards  but  well  within  our  capacity  to  supply.  We  could  take
leadership  in arranging  for  orderly  distribution  of food  aid  among
countries  and  in  developing  terms  conducive  to  its  effective  use.
Such steps  might improve  our standing among  nations  and prepare
others  and  ourselves  for  dealing  with  a  crunch that  may  come  with
little warning.
Domestic food consumption subsidies. USDA  research  suggests
that the  food  stamp  program  is  for  one-half to  two-thirds  effective
in  increasing recipients'  expenditures  for food.  The remainder  is  an
increase  in their income  available  for spending  on  other  goods  and
services.  The  program  is  thus  more  effective  than  equivalent  cash
grants  in  increasing  food  expenditures  but  more  narrowly
constrains  consumers'  choices.
The  limited  data  on  the  subject  suggests  that  the  stamp
program's  contribution  to  essential  nutritional  needs  is  much  less
than  to  food  expenditures,  because  some  purchased  foods  are  of
little  nutritive  value  or  supply  nutrients  not  needed  in  larger
amounts.
Apparently,  significant  contributions  are  made  to  incomes  of
farmers  who  produce  the  types  of foods  most  demanded  by  stamp
users.  Administrative  problems  in  reserving  benefits  to  the  truly
poor  have  appeared  and  have eroded  support  for the program.
Reduced  price  meals  under the  school  lunch  program  and some
other  nutritional  programs  also  supplement  incomes  and  nutrition
of the  poor.  Probably  welfare  would  be  improved  by  shifting  food
subsidy  funds  from  the  special  milk  program  to  reduced-price
meals  under the  school  lunch program.
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food  consumption  subsidies  is  not their special  impact  on  nutrition
but  the  political  feasibility  of  providing  income  assistance  to  the
poor  in this way.
Price support. This  is the  first of several  policy instruments  that
might  be  used  to  support  farm  income,  particularly  in  times  of
surplus.  The  two  familiar  devices  are  nonrecourse  loans  as  for
grains,  and direct  government  purchases  as  for  manufactured  dairy
products.
Price support  increases  the  income  of producers  if output  is  not
restricted  and  also  ordinarily increases  it but to lesser  extent,  if out-
put  is  restricted  to  the  amount  that  can  be  sold  at  the  support
level.
Stability  of markets  is  increased,  for  price  support  puts  a  floor
under  the  market,  and  stocks  acquired  for  support  purposes  are
often  available  for  release  later  if prices  temporarily  rise.  Benefits
to  producers  are  approximately  in  proportion  to  the  amount  sold.
They  cannot  be  restricted  to  a  particular  size  group.  Costs  to
government  depend  on  the  level  at  which  price  is  supported,  the
duration  of  support,  and  the  volume  of  production  of  the
commodity.
When  the  U.S.  is  by  far  the  largest  actual  and  potential
supplier  of a  product  in  world  trade,  modest  price  support  may
reduce  the  volume  of export very  little  and  might  actually  increase
dollar  earnings.  But  when  important  competition  does  or  might
exist,  significant  price  support  is  likely  to  reduce  both  export
volume  and  dollar earnings.
Such a result  is  bad for the  nation  and  reduces  the  effectiveness
of  price  support  for  improving  farmers  incomes.  Apparently,  the
U.S.  can  support  prices  of  feed  grains,  wheat,  and  soybeans  in
times  of surplus  at  levels  low  enough  not  to  stimulate  production
elsewhere  but  high  enough  to  be  of  some  help  to  U.S.  farmers.
However,  high  supports  can  cause  great difficulties.
Production control devices.  Production  control  is  likely  to  be
needed  when  price  support  or  supplemental  payment  programs  are
in  effect.  This  is  in  order  to  prevent  wasteful  production  and
surplus  stocks.  Limitation  of land  devoted  to  a  crop,  although  an
imperfect  device,  is  usually  the  most  practicable  form  of  crop
control.
Non-use  of  the  land  withdrawn  from  a  crop  is  essential  to
prevent transfer  of resources  to  other crops  and  seems  necessary  if
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accompany  land  restrictions  and can  be used  alone  for  some  crops
or  for  livestock.
Production  control  is primarily  a farm income  support device.  It
is  also  important  as  a  method  of stabilization.  Reserve  stocks  can
be  viewed  as  a  first  line  of  defense  against  instability,  with
production  control  a  second  line  when  stocks  become  excessive.
Both  stocks  accumulated  in  time  of  surplus  and  land  withdrawn
from  production  increase  the  stabilization  capability  of  agri-
culture.
Farmers  have  agreed  in  the  past  to  compulsory  production
control  in  return for  high-level price  support if land did  not have to
be retired.  But compulsory land  retirement  has  not been  acceptable
to farmers.  Payments  to  farmers  just high  enough  to  induce  suffi-
cient voluntary compliance  with a land  retirement  program,  so  that
markets  are  not  overburdened  at  price  support  levels,  have  been
workable.
The  cost  to  government  is  substantial  and  increases  rapidly  as
the  degree  of  price  support  rises.  So-called  voluntary  production
control  for  crops,  employing  compliance  payments,  appears  to  be
feasible  only  if accompanying  price  supports  are  modest.
Compliance  payments  have  a  built-in  insurance  feature.
Ordinarily  they  are  based  on  normal  yields  and  are  made  even
though  the  farmer  has  a  crop  failure.  There  is  little  opportunity  to
influence  the  distribution  of the  benefits  of  a  joint  price  support,
production  control,  and  compliance  payment  program  among
producers,  because  large  producers  not  eligible  for  payments  can
nevertheless  produce  and  sell  at the  supported  market  price.
Supplemental payments.  These  payments  are  made  to  supple-
ment  producers'  incomes  and  either  do  not  require  producers  to
comply  with  production  controls  or  are  in  excess  of  the  amount
required  to  induce  participation.  The  wool  program  uses  supple-
mental  payments  only.  The  wheat  program  of the  late  1960s  had,
in  effect,  supplemental  payment  on top  of compliance  payments.
Supplemental  payments  add  to  farmers'  incomes  and  can  be
modified  to  limit  benefits  going  to  particular  classes  of  farmers.
Supplemental  payments  can  be exceedingly  costly  to  government  if
applied  to  important  products  without  accompanying  production
control.  If paid  on exported  products  but not  accompanied  by tight
production  controls,  supplemental  payments  are  a  form  of  export
subsidy  and  will  understandably  be resented  by  other countries.
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would  lead  to  payments  that  might  be  either  supplemental
payments,  compliance  payments,  or  a  combination  of  both.  The
secretary  of agriculture  has  wide  leeway  as to  when  he  must  invoke
acreage  restrictions.  If he  chose  to  make  the  payments  called  for
when  market  prices  were  below  target  prices  without  requiring
production  control,  he  would  be  administering  a  strictly  supple-
mental  payment  program.
If  he  required  acreage  restriction,  producers  would  have  to
comply  to  receive  payments,  but  the  prescribed  payment  formula
might  produce  just  the  amount  needed  to  obtain  desired
compliance,  or  a higher  or lower  amount.  The fact that the  amount
of the  payment  is  known  only  near  the  end  of the  crop  year  rather
than  prior  to  planting  reduces  the  plan's  effectiveness  and  equity
for  production  control.
Purchase and noncommercial disposal.  A  common  device  has
been  to  purchase  poultry,  beef,  and  several  other  products  when
prices  were  low and to dispose  of them  in  such outlets  as  the  school
lunch  program  or foreign  food  aid.
Such  purchases  give  some  income  support  to  farmers  and
reduce  instability  by keeping  falling prices  from going  as far as they
otherwise  might.  Products  donated  to  the  school  lunch  program
probably  largely  displace  other  products  without  much  effect  on
total utilization  of food.
Production incentives.  Here  attention  turns  to  policy  instru-
ments  that  might  be  used  if  enduring  scarcity  seemed  likely.
Attractive  long-term  price  guarantees  for  basic  food  and  feed  crops
would encourage  farmers to  make  the  substantial  investments  often
required  to  bring  new  land  into  production  or  to  increase  the
productivity  of old  land.
Long-term  loans  at  subsidized  interest  rates  for  land  develop-
ment might be  used.  Assurance  of sufficient  petroleum  products  for
fertilizer  manufacture,  crop  production,  and  drying,  could  be
given.  Environmental  restraints  significantly  obstructing  food
production  but not essential  to human  health  might be  relaxed.
Research  on  agricultural  technology  could  be  increased.  So
could  research  on  non-agricultural  food  sources,  on  new  food
products  such  as  meat substitutes,  and  on human  nutrition.  There
is  an  obligation  on  the  part  of  society  to  help  producers  adjust
without  undue  hardship  if  accelerated  output  expansion  to  meet
national  objectives  is  not needed.
50Export  restrictions.  This  point  logically  belongs  under  the
international  trade  topic  discussed  earlier,  but  its  recent  promi-
nence  warrants  special  mention.  In my view,  export  restriction  is  a
warranted  part  of a  food  policy  that  encourages  importing  nations
to  carry  stocks,  to  make  advance  arrangements  for  their  principal
needs,  and to rely upon U.S.  supply if they hold  up their end  of the
bargain.
Export  restrictions  would  then  be  applied  when  importers  made
exceptional  demands  that  the  U.S.  could  not  meet  without
materially  depriving  its  regular  export  customers  or  its  own
consumers  (and  livestock  producers).  In  this  sense,  export
restrictions  applied  according  to  established  and  understood
guidelines  would  be  a  second  line  of  defense  against  market
instability  accompanying  scarcity.
But  hit-or-miss  restrictions  to  placate  a  labor  union,  to  avoid
heat  from  consumer  activists,  or  to  escape  from  traps  resulting
from having no  policy at all are entirely different  and should  not be
allowed  to  happen.
Applications  to Current Issues
Let's bring  the  foregoing  discussion  of policy  instruments  into
focus  by outlining  what  a comprehensive  food  policy  might be like.
The  Agriculture  and  Consumer  Protection  Act  of  1973  will  be
the  starting  point  in  considering  legislation  needed  in  1977.  It
would  have  to  be  substantially  modified  and  expanded,  and  other
policy  positions  would  have  to be developed,  to  build  a satisfactory
framework  for dealing  with  potential  future  problems.
The  act  contains  provision  for  a  token  disaster  reserve.  This
should  be  transformed  into  a  directive  for  an  operating  reserve
stock program  including  at  least feed  grains,  wheat,  and  soybeans.
The  Commodity  Credit  Corporation,  starting  gradually,  would
acquire,  and  later  dispose  of,  inventories  as  necessary  to  maintain
total  national  stocks  of  designated  commodities  at  prescribed
average  levels.  This could be done  over, say,  seven-year  periods  and
to keep  national  stocks  within  stated  limits each  year.  Prices  would
not have  to fall to loan (support) levels  before stocks  were  acquired.
The mechanics  of the  program  are highly  important.
Price  support through  crop  loans  should  be  continued,  but  the
levels  applicable  in  1978  should  be set  high  enough  to  make  loans
likely to be effective  if real net farm  income dropped to its  pre-1973
position.
51Changes  in  loan  levels  in later  years  should  be  made  according
to  specialized  indexes  of changes  in  non-land  production  costs  for
the  crops.  This  would  be  preferable  to  the  scarcely  relevant
formulas  now  provided  for  target  prices.
In  most  cases  acreage  control  provisions  of  the  set-aside  type
and  applicable  also  to  soybeans,  peanuts,  and  tobacco,  should  be
continued  to  deal  with  surpluses  (exceeding  reserve-stock  upper
limits)  should  they  appear.
Strictly  compliance  payments,  set  at  levels  necessary  to  get
required  participation  and  announced  prior  to  planting  dates,
should  replace  target  prices;  payments  would  be  used  only  when
set-asides  were  in effect.  Acreage  allotment  bases  for administration
of the program  urgently  need to be updated  perhaps  to the  1974-76
average.
The  principal  domestic  food  consumption  programs  should  be
continued  but tightened  as  necessary  to  effectively  reach  the  poor.
If  the  "welfare  mess"  were  ever  resolved  by  means  of  a
well-designed  general  income  support  program  for  the  poor,  the
food stamp  program  could be terminated.
In  the  international  trade  area,  authorization  should  be
provided  as  necessary  to  enable  the  administration  to  develop  the
policy  already  outlined.  This  would  encourage  advance  arrange-
ments  with  importing  countries  to  make  supply  commitments  and
to establish  guidelines  as  to how  exports  would  be  allocated  in  the
event  of  severe  shortage.
Further,  the  U.S.  should  take  positive  leadership  in  developing
orderly means  of dealing  with  potential  problems  of providing food
aid  to poor countries.  Authorizing  changes  are needed  in P.L.  480.
Attention  to  food  aid  should  not  divert  the  U.S.  from  the  more
important task of helping poor  countries  to increase  their own  food
production.
Changes  in  legislation  relating  to  collective  marketing  by
farmers  and  to  marketing  orders  probably  are  not  advisable  now.
But the  administration  may  have to  emphasize  market  stabilization
and orderly marketing  procedures  rather than monopolistic  pricing.
Possibly  attacks  under  the  antitrust  laws  will  weaken  the  latter.
The  probability  of persistent  scarcity  is  not now  high  enough  to
warrant  use  of the  more  ambitious  instruments  to  expand  output.
But neither is sufficient  food  so  assured that the  nation  should  seek
to  avoid  all  risk  of having  to provide  farm  income  support.
52Thus,  loan  levels  should  be  high  enough  to  assure  farmers  of
tolerable  prices  if farmers  overproduce,  reserve  stock  goals  should
be  set  at  generous  levels,  and  research  on  agricultural  technology,
new  foods,  and  nutrition  should  be  pushed.  A  little too  much  food
will be  a lot  easier to  live  with than  too little.
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